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Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc: The Fourth Circuit's
"Simple Logic" of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII
With the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the United States Congress prohibited private employers from
discriminating on the basis of sex.1 In doing so, Congress unwittingly
initiated a long judicial search for the definition of sex
discrimination During this search, various courts have determined
that both men and women can discriminate and be discriminated
against on the basis of sex,3 that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is not sex discrimination,4 and that sexual harassment is
sex discrimination.5 Now, thirty years after its enactment, Title VII
has given the federal courts a new challenge: same-sex sexual
harassment.6
The federal district courts have not shied away from this
challenge, but their efforts have tended to produce more confusion
than elucidation.7 Currently, the federal circuit courts are split as to
1. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
2. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (noting the paucity of legislative
history for the meaning of "sex" in Title VII).
3. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (prohibiting sexual
harassment against both men and women).
4. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979)
("Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis
of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as
homosexuality." (footnotes omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without
question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." (alteration in original)). See
generally Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of
Standards for Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2049 (1997)
(discussing institutional liability for sexual harassment under Title IX).
6. Courts often use "same-sex" and "same-gender" interchangeably. This Note uses
"same-sex" to refer to the courts' use of either term. See infra notes 86-99 and
accompanying text for discussion and criticism of the courts' definitions of these terms.
7. This area of the law has been very active. Many cases have been decided just
since February 1996. Some courts have found same-sex sexual harassment claims
actionable. See, e.g., McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (M.D. Ga.
1997); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 706 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Wiley v. Burger King,
No. CIV.A.96-4859, 1996 WL 648455, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1996); Johnson v. Hondo,
Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); McElroy v. TNS Mills, Inc., 953 F. Supp.
1383, 1387 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D.
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whether Title VII includes a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment,' and the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.9 In
the fall of 1996, the Fourth Circuit added its voice to this debate in
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc."0 In Wrightson, the court
held that same-sex sexual harassment claims are viable under Title
VII, but it confined that ruling to situations in which the perpetrator
is homosexual."
This Note addresses the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wrightson,
with particular emphasis on its use of the perpetrator's sexual
orientation as a basis of a Title VII claim.' After reviewing the facts
and conclusions of the case, the Note traces the history and
development of the Title VII sexual harassment claim?3 Next, the
Note describes the split among the circuit courts by detailing the
circuit courts' various approaches to same-sex sexual harassment
claims.'4 The Note then examines broader issues, including whether
Title VII should cover same-sex sexual harassment and, if so,
whether it should retain the sexual orientation distinction made by
Wrightson.'5 Finally, the Note examines the need for consistency in
this area of the law and the potential for guidance from the Supreme
Colo. 1996); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia & Creative Remodeling, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-2380,
1996 WL 368316, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Wehrle v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F.
Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp.
269,273 (D. Utah 1996); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495,
1500-01 (E.D. Va. 1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C.
1996). Other courts, however, have found no cause of action under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Arthur Anderson [sic] & Co., No. CIV.A.3:96-CV-2206-D, 1997 WL 74709, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 1997); Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952,
961-62 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 737-38 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 784-85 (C.D. Ill. 1996);
Larry v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960, 963 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Martin v. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (N.D. Ala. 1996); King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F.
Supp. 62,66 (D.N.H. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 116 F.3d 965 (1st Cir. 1997).
& See infra notes 120-241 and accompanying text (detailing the split among the
circuit courts). While the federal district courts have considered the issue of same-sex
sexual harassment with greater frequency than the circuit courts, their opinions are not
considered in detail here for the sake of brevity and because the circuit courts present the
same general reasoning used at the district court level.
9. On June 9, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Joseph Oncale to
examine a May 20, 1996 decision by the Fifth Circuit. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997), granting cert. to 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996); see also
infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text (discussing Oncale).
10. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
11. See id n at 141.
12. See infra notes 271-84 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 17-119 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 120-241 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 242-320 and accompanying text.
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Court.16
In March 1993, sixteen-year-old Arthur Wrightson, a
heterosexual male, began work as a cook and waiter at a Pizza Hut in
Charlotte, North Carolina.17 His immediate supervisor was Bobby
Howard, an openly homosexual male."8 Wrightson's co-workers
included five other openly homosexual men and three heterosexual
men.19 In November or December 1993, the homosexual employees,
including Howard, "began sexually harassing Wrightson and the
other heterosexual male employees" by pressuring them into
homosexual sex.' This harassment occurred daily "for seven months,
in the presence of and within the knowledge of upper management."
2
'
1
Howard harassed Wrightson in various ways. For example, he
graphically described his homosexual lifestyle to Wrightson7 and
made crude suggestions regarding homosexual sex.' Howard also
touched Wrightson in a sexually provocative manner while inviting
Wrightson to engage in homosexual behavior.24 During this activity,
the heterosexual men subjected to harassment, including Wrightson,
16. See infra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
17. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 139. Because the district court granted Pizza Hut's
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss
Wrightson's complaint for failure to state a claim, the court of appeals accepted as true,
for the purpose of the appeal, the facts alleged in Wrightson's complaint and affidavits.
See id; see also Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecomm. Satellite Org., 991 F.2d
94, 97 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that on appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
the appellate court must accept as true the facts as alleged by the plaintiff). Thus, the
facts described here are those alleged by the plaintiff.
18. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 139.
19. See id.
20. Id Wrightson did not allege that the homosexual workers sexually harassed
female employees or homosexual men. See id. Instead, he alleged that when a new male
worker started work, the homosexual employees would try to determine if he was
heterosexual or homosexual. See id If he was heterosexual, then the harassment would
begin. See id
21. Id. Wrightson formally complained to management about the harassment. See
id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 140.
24. See id. The touching included running his hands through Wrightson's hair,
massaging Wrightson's shoulders, intentionally rubbing his (Howard's) genital area
against Wrightson's buttocks, and trying to look down Wrightson's pants. See id. Howard
also harassed the other heterosexual male employees, attempting to kiss one of them and
suggesting that others try anal sex. See id. Other homosexual male employees also
participated in the harassment. See id. For example, one homosexual male employee told
the heterosexual men he wanted to have his teeth taken out to make oral sex better. See
id. Another homosexual male employee asked a heterosexual male employee on a date
and told another that Wrightson obtained more breaks "because he performed oral sex."
Id.
308 [Vol. 76
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
"made it absolutely clear" to the homosexual men that this behavior
"was unwelcome." ' For example, they repeatedly told the harassers
to stop, threatened to file complaints, and finally did complain
directly to management.' Nevertheless, the harassment continued.'
According to Wrightson's complaint, the manager of the Pizza
Hut, Jennifer Tyson, and the assistant manager, Romeo Acker, knew
about the harassment and the objections to it.2 Tyson even admitted
to Wrightson's mother, Cathy Celentano, "that she was aware of the
harassment and also that Howard's actions constituted sexual
harassment."'29 On one occasion, Tyson called a staff meeting in
which she ordered the homosexual employees to stop the harassment
and told them their actions "violated federal law."" However,
following the meeting, the harassment intensified, and the
homosexual men openly "joked about the possibility of a federal
sexual harassment suit."31  No disciplinary action was ever taken
against the homosexual male employees.32
In August 1995, Wrightson filed an action against Pizza Hut in
the United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, alleging sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII.
33
Wrightson alleged that actions by Howard and the other homosexual
employees had resulted in a" 'hostile work environment' in violation
of Title VII. ' 4
The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Wrightson had
failed to state a claim because "[t]here is no evidence that Congress
intended to prohibit intra-gender harassment in enacting Title VII. ' '3
The court relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding that "same-gender
harassment is not actionable under Title VII, even if the harassment
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. Wrightson and his mother complained to management several times, and
Tyson and Acker observed the harassment on several occasions. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id at 140-41.
32. See id. at 140. Tyson contended that she felt unable to control the activities. See
id.
33. See id. at 141-42 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994) (containing Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964)).
34. Id. at 141. For a discussion of the elements of hostile work environment claims
under Title VII, see infra text accompanying note 117.
35. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 367, 368 (W.D.N.C. 1995),
rev'd, 99 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
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has sexual overtones."' The Fourth Circuit rejected this reasoning
and reversed the lower court, holding that a hostile work
environment claim may be brought for same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII "where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment is
homosexual."37
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit recognized that no other circuit
court had squarely addressed the issue of whether same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable when the perpetrator is homosexual, but
that several circuits had suggested that same-sex sexual harassment
claims may lie in at least some circumstances. 3' The court began its
analysis by examining McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors,39 its sole prior decision on same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII.O In McWilliams, the court held that "no Title VII
36. ld. (citing Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)).
For a discussion of Garcia, see infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
37. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141. The court did not state whether the victim must be
heterosexual, as was the case here. Thus, after Wrightson, the question of whether a
same-sex sexual harassment claim may be brought by a homosexual against another
homosexual remains undecided in the Fourth Circuit.
38. See icL at 141 n.1 (citing Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1380 (8th Cir.
1996) (reversing a summary judgment against a man who claimed sexual harassment by
other men); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a
same-sex sexual harassment claim could lie under Title VII); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir.) (finding that binding precedent made it
necessary to decline review of a district court ruling that there is no same-sex sexual
harassment claim under Title VII), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 95 F.3d
56 (1996), cert granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25
F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that a same-sex sexual harassment claim could
lie under Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (suggesting
that sexual harassment may be found regardless of the sex of the perpetrator or the
victim, as long as it is "based on the sex" of the victim)). There are additional circuit
court decisions that recognize same-sex sexual harassment claims in at least some
circumstances. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir.
1997) (finding that same-sex sexual harassment claims will stand when harassment is
"because of... sex"); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir.
1993) (Van Graafeiland, 5., concurring) (suggesting that the sex of the harasser is
irrelevant to a Title VII claim); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192
(1st Cir. 1990) (finding a cause of action for homosexual-on-heterosexual same-sex sexual
harassment under Title VII); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir.
1984), afg 597 F. Supp. 537, 541-42 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (holding that homosexual male
harassment of another man violates Title VII). See generally infra notes 145-241 and
accompanying text (describing in more detail how the other circuit courts have ruled on
same-sex sexual harassment).
39. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
40. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141. Following McWilliams, the Fourth Circuit
considered another same-sex sexual harassment case, Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996). The Hopkins court,
however, never reached the Title VII issue, and thus Hopkins is not direct precedent for
Wrightson. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text (discussing Hopkins).
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cause of action for 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment lies
when both the perpetrator and target of the harassment are
heterosexuals of the same sex."41  The court noted that in
McWilliams, however, it had reserved consideration of a claim of
same-sex sexual harassment in circumstances when the perpetrator
was homosexual.42
The Wrightson court then examined Title VII, which provides
that " '[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge ... or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex.' , Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the
court recognized that "[t]he 'work environment' constitutes a 'termf-,
or condition[], or privilege] of employment.' 44 Thus, the court
concluded that "'a cause of action [exists] under Title VII for
persons forced to work in an environment where sexual harassment
has created a hostile or abusive atmosphere.' "45
Next, the court listed the four requirements necessary for an
employee to prove a hostile work environment claim: "(1) that he
was harassed 'because of' his 'sex'; (2) that the harassment was
unwelcome; (3) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an abusive working environment; and (4) that
some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer."' The court
explicitly declined to create a further statutory requirement that the
perpetrator of the harassment be of a different sex than the victim,
and instead looked strictly at the wording of the statute.7 The court
reasoned that "the statute obviously places no gender limitation
whatsoever on the perpetrator or the target of the harassment.
"4
That is, Title VII prohibits perpetrators of either sex from
41. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141 (citing McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195).
42. See id. (citing McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n.4).
43. Id. at 141-42 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)) (alterations in original).
44. Id. at 142 (quoting language found generally throughout Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64-67 (1986)) (alterations in original).
45. Id. (quoting Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66-67)) (alterations in original).
46. Id. (citing McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195; Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557).
47. See id. ("The district court below interpreted Title VII to require also that the
perpetrator of the 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment be of a different sex than
the target of the harassment in order for the harassment to be cognizable under Title VII.
We discern no such requirement in the statute.").
48. Id.
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discriminating against individual employees of either sex. 49
Furthermore, the court determined that Title VII's causal
requirement that discrimination be "'because of' the employee's
sex," did not require the pe.rpetrator and the victim to be of different
sexes.' The court concluded that an employee could satisfy this
condition if he or she can show that" 'but for' the employee's sex, he
or she would not have been the victim of the discrimination."" Based
on "simple logic," the court then determined that "an employer of
either sex can discriminate against his or her employees of the same
sex because of their sex, just as he or she may discriminate against
employees of the opposite sex because of their sex."' 2 The court
offered the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") interpretation of Title VII as additional support for this
logic:
"The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser.... [T]he crucial inquiry is whether the harasser
treats a member or members of one sex differently from
members of the other sex. The victim and the harasser may
be of the same sex where, for instance, the sexual
harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the victim's
sexual preference) and the harasser does not treat
employees of the opposite sex the same way."
53
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Id (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). Actually, the
concept of "because of the employee's sex" is different from "but for the employee's
sex." See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-46. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court
concluded that "since ... the words 'because of' do not mean 'solely because of,' we also
know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate considerations." Id. at 241.
52. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142. The court explained that, for example, a male
employer might discriminate against male employees but not against female employees,
and a female employer might discriminate against female employees and not against male
employees, but that would constitute discrimination "'because of'" the employee's sex
just as much as discrimination against employees of the opposite sex would. See id.
53. Id at 143 (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987)) (alterations
in original, including the court's deemphasis of the word "not" as it is used in the
parenthetical statement "not on the victim's sexual preference"). The EEOC offers a fact
situation similar to this case as an example of a valid Title VII action:
If a male supervisor of male and female employees makes unwelcome sexual
advances toward a male employee because the employee is male but does not
make similar advances toward female employees, then the male supervisor's
conduct may constitute sexual harassment since the disparate treatment is based
on the male employee's sex.
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCII) § 615.2(b)(3). For more discussion of the EEOC's
interpretation of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII, see infra note 87 and
accompanying text.
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Using this logic, the Wrightson court held that a same-sex hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII may lie
when "a homosexual.., employer discriminates against an employee
of the same sex or permits such discrimination."'
However, despite the potential for an expansive interpretation of
Title VII in Wrightson, the court expressly limited its holding to very
narrow circumstances.55 Critical to the court's holding that Wrightson
had a valid Title VII claim was the allegation of discrimination
"'because of his sex'" and the allegation that only male employees
faced such discrimination." The court carefully distinguished
Wrightson's allegations from circumstances that would not give rise
to a valid Title VII claim.' Specifically, the court stated that a
plaintiff in Wrightson's position could not go forward with his claim
if: (1) Pizza Hut's homosexual employees harassed young men and
women alike; (2) "Wrightson was harassed simply because he was
heterosexual"; or (3) "the offensive conduct was the product solely of
... perversion.
58
Accordingly, the court dismissed Pizza Hut's contention that
Wrightson's harassment claim was based on his sexual orientation
rather than his sex.59 The court agreed that Title VII does not offer a
cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation, but it
stated that Wrightson had specifically alleged discrimination because
of his sex, and for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), the court had to
assume that the allegation was true.' Moreover, the court explained,
"even had Wrightson alleged that he was discriminated against both
because he was heterosexual and because he was male, he would still
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 61 That is, his sex did not have to
be the sole cause of the harassment.62 Finally, upon contemplating
the policy considerations of its decision, the court felt compelled to
follow the plain language of the statute while acknowledging the
possibility that the decision could increase litigation.6
54. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143.
55. See id at 141.
56. Id. at 143.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See iU.
60. See id. For a discussion of claims for sexual orientation harassment under Title
VII, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
61. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144.
62. See id.; see also supra note 51 (describing the meaning of "because of sex").
63. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144.
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Judge Murnaghan dissented." He asserted that Wrightson had a
number of state claims against Howard and Pizza Hut management,
including "assault, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress."'" Therefore, although he agreed with the
majority that Howard and Pizza Hut should be held liable to
Wrightson, he disagreed that the liability lay within Title VII." Judge
Murnaghan reasoned that the majority interpreted Title VII's
"because of sex" language too broadly,'7 and noted that Title VII was
enacted to create workplace equality for men and women." He also
argued that the scant legislative history did not grant the judiciary the
authority to add new claims, such as a heterosexual male suing a
homosexual male for harassment; rather, Judge Murnaghan felt that
by pointing out that Congress had not given adequate guidance, the
courts could alert Congress to the need to address whether such
claims exist under Title VII. 9
In addition, Judge Murnaghan stated that, because of fairness
concerns, Wrightson's claim was precluded by the McWilliams
decision, which held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual
harassment of a heterosexual by another heterosexual of the same
sex.70  He concluded that "[t]o hold Title VII applicable to
heterosexual/homosexual but not to heterosexual/heterosexual
conduct produces a result more discriminatory than a ruling ... that
same sex discrimination is not covered by Title VII."' While
acknowledging that the law ought to protect homosexual and
64. See Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see also infra note 335-37 and accompanying text
(describing potential state claims for sexual harassment).
66. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Judge Murnaghan
stated that "'[e]very example of offensive and tasteless workplace conduct does not
provide the basis of a cause of action under Title VII.'" Id (Mumaghan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir.) (Wilkinson,
C.J., concurring in part), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996)).
67. See id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 145 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
69. See id. (Murnaghan,.J., dissenting). Judge Murnaghan was particularly concerned
that Congress never contemplated such use of Title VII; therefore, he argued that
Congress should be the first to determine its validity. See id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting);
see also infra notes 324-29 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative and judicial
roles in determining the viability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII).
70. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (citing McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72
(1996)).
71. 1d. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 271-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the potential discriminatory effects of only allowing homosexual-on-
heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment).
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heterosexual workers from lewd and repulsive comments and actions
by same-sex co-workers and management, Judge Murnaghan asserted
that Title VII was not intended to be that law.'
The issue Judge Murnaghan described-whether Title VII was
intended to cover same-sex sexual harassment-has been the subject
of significant controversy in the courts and in legal academia.'3 Some
courts have considered cases of heterosexual-on-heterosexual
harassment' while others have confronted instances of homosexual-
on-heterosexual harassment.' Moreover, some have considered quid
pro quo harassment, 6 while others have looked only at hostile work
environment claims.r To understand how these courts have
approached this controversial issue, one must examine the statute
and its history.
The statute at issue, Title VII, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
72. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145-46 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (citing McWilliams,
72 F.3d at 1196).
73. See infra notes 145-241 and accompanying text (describing how the circuit courts
have ruled). Compare E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Saic" Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 56, 80-81 (1997) (arguing that same-sex sexual harassment should not be
actionable under Title VII largely because of its disparate impact on homosexuals), and
Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is It Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1147,1185 (1996) (concluding
that Title VII should not cover same-sex sexual harassment because the courts have been
unable to find a clear standard to apply to the situation), with Regina L. Stone-Harris,
Same-Sex Harassment-The Next Step in the Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under
Title VII, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 269, 272-73 (1996) (asserting that same-sex sexual
harassment should be recognized by the courts and offering suggestions on how to do so),
and Amy Shahan, Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of Action for Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 524-27 (1996) (concluding that Title VII
should provide a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment).
74. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
a cause of action for heterosexual-on-heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment); see also
infra notes 161-81 (discussing Quick).
75. See, e.g., Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir.
1997) (recognizing a cause of action for homosexual-on-heterosexual same-sex sexual
harassment); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997)
(same); see also infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text (discussing Yeary and
Fredette).
76. A type of sexual harassment, quid pro quo harassment occurs when an employee
is required to submit to sexual harassment as a condition of receiving job benefits. See
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
77. Compare Yeary, 107 F.3d at 445 (concerning hostile work environment), and
Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374 (concerning hostile work environment), with Fredette, 112 F.3d at
1510 (concerning both hostile work environment and quid pro quo harassment).
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
78origin.
The Supreme Court has stated that the goal of Title VII is to
provide a broad range of protection from discrimination in
employment.7 Unfortunately, the legislative history offers little
insight into the definition of "sex" and how it should be interpreted.'
Congress's main purpose in enacting Title VII was the prevention of
racial discrimination," and "sex" was added in a floor amendment in
the House of Representatives the day before the bill was approved,
without any hearing or debate. 2
Why "sex" was added to the bill at the last minute remains
puzzling. According to one theory, it was added to protect white
78. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a) (1994).
79. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64-66 (1986).
80. See id, at 64 ("[W]e are left with little legislative history to guide us in
interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.' ").
81. See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (comments of Rep. Green of Oregon)
("Whether we want to admit it or not, the main purpose of this legislation today is to try
to help end the discrimination that has been practiced against Negroes.").
82. The amendment was offered by Representative Howard Smith, a principal
opponent of the bill. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (comments of Rep. Smith of
Virginia). Representative Smith proposed the addition of "sex" in order to "do some
good for the minority sex." Id. (comments of Rep. Smith). Representative Celler
opposed it because it covered all persons, men and women alike. See id. at 2578
(comments of Rep. Celler of New York). Representative Celler believed that an
amendment adopting blanket language requiring total equality would create social
upheaval. See id. at 2577 (comments of Rep. Celler). However, it passed, in the view of
Representative Griffiths, so that a qualified white woman denied a job would have some
recourse if her job was taken by an African-American. See id at 2579 (comments of Rep.
Griffiths of Michigan); see also Renee Levay, Employment Law-Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Walden Book Co.: Does/Should Title VII Apply to Same-
Gender Sexual Harassment? 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1601, 1603 (1996) (citing 110 CONG.
REC. 2581 (1964) (comments of Rep. Green of Oregon)) (suggesting that the word "sex"
may have been added as a political maneuver to confuse the issue and thus defeat the
bill).
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women's jobs from the African-American women who would gain
from the racial provisions of Title VII.' Another theory contends
that it was added by southern congressmen to prevent any civil rights
bill from being passed."' Regardless of what happened, however, the
bill passed with "sex" included, but without any clear expression of
congressional intent; thus, the provision opened the door to massive
litigation as the courts attempted to develop a doctrine of sex
discrimination on their own.'
Generally, the courts have interpreted sex narrowly, equating it
with gender." This interpretation follows the EEOC's description of
the intent of Congress in Title VII that "sex" refer to "a person's
gender, an immutable characteristic with which a person is born. '
However, a more comprehensive definition may better serve the
purposes of the statute.' For example, I. Bennett Capers has
proposed that sex is primarily biological and physical, while gender
includes "characteristics traditionally labelled [sic] 'masculine' and
'feminine' and is a function of socialization, having social, cultural,
and psychological components." 9 Thus, sex does not equal gender.
Capers asserts that equating sex with gender and keeping the two
83. See Levay, supra note 82, at 1603 n.10.
84. See id at 1603-04 (discussing this history); Shahan, supra note 73, at 510
(asserting that "sex" was added to divide the initial supporters of the bill).
85. At the time the amendment passed, The New Republic called it "a mischievous
joke perpetrated on the floor of the House of Representatives." Sex and Nonsense, NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 10, 10; see also I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and
Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1158, 1168 n.44 (1991) (discussing the New Republic
article). Years later, a judge, recognizing the same inauspicious origin of the law,
commentid that the "sex" amendment had been a "joke." See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 584 F. Supp. 419,428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
86. See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304,306-07 (2d Cir.
1986) ("The proscribed differentiation under Title VII, therefore, must be a distinction
based on a person's sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations."); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (declining to extend sex to include
transsexuality); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979)
(declining to extend sex to include homosexuality); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Congress has not shown any intent other than to
restrict the term 'sex' to its traditional meaning.").
87. EEOC Dec. No. 76-75, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6495, at 4266 (Mar. 2, 1976). The
EEOC, the agency charged with the enforcement of Title VII, may offer guidelines to
inform the court, but the court is not bound to follow them. See General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (" 'We consider that the rulings, interpretations and
opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'" (quoting Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
88. See Capers, supra note 85, at 1170.
89. Id. at 1160.
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sex/genders, male and female, directly opposite one another are
essential to the heterosexist paradigm." Several feminist theorists
who question heterosexism also work to deconstruct the sex/gender
link.91 They conclude that gender is a social construction and, as such,
exists on a continuum containing a number of male and female
genders, some even overlapping.' Capers argues that one of the
problems with equating sex and gender is that the continuum is
ignored and that only feminine women and masculine men, that is,
the two sexes, are considered to be genders.' This equation, he
concludes, perpetuates heterosexism.'
Nevertheless, a narrow concept of sex and the concurrent
acceptance of heterosexism, as opposed to the potentially broader
reading, have influenced the courts' interpretations of sexual
harassment under Title VII in a number of ways.95 For example,
courts clearly have not recognized a cause of action for sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII.96 This suggests that these
courts view gender only as sex and not as sexuality or sexual
practices.
However, the courts have read "sex" broadly in another sense,
concluding that Title VII provides protection for men as well as
90. See id. "Heterosexism ... refers to institutionalized valorization of heterosexual
activity." Id. at 1159. Capers argues that heterosexism constricts both men and women
by forcing them into strict gender roles. See id. at 1162.
91. See id. at 1160-61 (discussing the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Judith P.
Butler). See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) (developing a theory of sexed, gendered, and sexual
identity as performative instead of essential in nature); SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE
SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1952) (1949) (arguing
that gender is acquired).
92. See Capers, supra note 85, at 1161.
93. See id. at 1162.
94. See id.
95. See generally infra notes 271-82 and accompanying text (discussing how a
heterosexist bias has affected and could continue to affect sexual harassment law).
96. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69,70 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that "Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals"); DeSantis
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that in Title VII,
"sex" should not be judicially extended to include homosexuality); see also Capers, supra
note 85, at 1168-69 (stating that courts have interpreted "sex" in a traditional manner).
Moreover, Congress has not amended the statute to prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation. See generally Marie Elena Peluso, Note, Tempering Title Vii's Straight
Arrow Approack Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims of Employment
Discrimination, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1533 (1993) (arguing that Congress should amend Title
VII to protect homosexuals from sex discrimination). For a discussion of the tension
between not allowing a Title VII sexual orientation claim and allowing a same-sex sexual
harassment claim, see infra notes 285-96 and accompanying text.
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womenY The Supreme Court has found that Title VII "evinces a
congressional intent '"to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women"' in employment."98 With both sexes
protected by the statute, the key issue involved in Wrightson is
whether the victim and the harasser must be of different sexes in
order for there to be a Title VII claim.99
The plain language of Title VII does not specifically address
sexual harassment, only sexual discrimination." o  Catharine
MacKinnon, a feminist legal theorist, argued that sexual harassment
is a form of sexual discrimination."0 ' She described sexual harassment
as "situations of persistent verbal suggestion, unwanted physical
contact, straightforward proposition, and coerced intercourse...
[including] [i]nsult, pressure, or intimidation having gender as its
basis or referent."'02 The judiciary followed her lead,'03 ultimately
resulting in the Supreme Court's creation of a Title VII sexual
harassment claim. The Court stated that "[w]ithout question, when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of
sex.'
10 4
97. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that Congress
intended to prohibit sexual harassment against men and women); Newport News
Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983) (holding that Title VII was
violated by an insurance plan that provided less extensive pregnancy benefits to married
male employees than to married female employees).
98. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of L.A_
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))) (emphasis added). The Court
noted in Meritor that sexual harassment in return for the privilege of employment is
demeaning to both men and women. See id. at 66-67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
99. See infra notes 120-241 and accompanying text (detailing the circuits' same-sex
sexual harassment cases and their lack of consensus).
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (making it unlawful "otherwise to
discriminate ... because of such individual's... sex").
101. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
27 (1979); see also Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the
Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 375, 379-80 (1995) (relying
on Professor MacKinnon in order to argue that Title VII should allow a broader range of
claims based on sexual harassment).
102. MACKINNON, supra note 101, at 237.
103. At least two federal district courts applied Professor MacKinnon's theories prior
to use of the theories by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1f72, 1196 (D. Del. 1983) (citing Professor MacKinnon and
stating that sexual harassment is a well-recognized cause of action under Title VII);
Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C. 1982) (citing Professor MacKinnon
while discussing the importance of tort claims in sex discrimination claims).
104. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (alteration in original)
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Professor MacKinnon, whose arguments have influenced the
judiciary in the creation of the sexual harassment claim,"5 bases her
overall theory on a simple observation: "the power of men over
women in society."'' 6 But she has divided her theory into two parts,
the "'differences' approach" and the "'inequality' approach."'O'
Under the differences theory, women as a gender group are treated
differently because they are women."8 Under the inequality theory,
sexual harassment works to perpetuate "a badge of female
servitude," as it objectifies and degrades women."9 Encompassing
both approaches, sexual harassment may be defined as "'the
exploitation of a powerful position to impose the sexual demands or
pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person.' ,,.o Given that
the sexual harassment claim was based on this male-female power
imbalance, it is an open question whether it can be extrapolated to
encompass male-male or female-female sexual harassment claims
(holding that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII). Professor MacKinnon was
an attorney on the brief for petitioner Mechelle Vinson, who claimed she had been
sexually harassed by her supervisor. See id. at 58, 60.
105. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 818 (1991) (describing
Professor MacKinnon's influence); Grose, supra note 101, at 379 (discussing Professor
MacKinnon's sexual harassment as sex discrimination theory as "one of the most
significant contributions made by feminist jurisprudence to mainstream legal thought");
Spitko, supra note 73, at 64 ("Professor Cathrine [sic] MacKinnon sets forth what are
perhaps the most influential arguments for bringing sexual harassment within the
meaning of the 'sex' discrimination prohibition in Title VII."). But see Drucilla Cornell,
Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2248 (1991) (reviewing CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989), and criticizing
Professor MacKinnon for basing her theory on the characterization of feminine sexual
difference as victimization only). See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of
Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U.
L. REv. 352 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MAcKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED], and explaining the controversy surrounding Professor MacKinnon's
theories).
106. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 105, at 5.
107. See MACKINNON, supra note 101, at 4. See generally Spitko, supra note 73, at 64-
67 (describing these theories and their relation to issues involved in same-sex sexual
harassment).
108. See MACKINNON, supra note 101, at 6 (concluding that women are forced to
endure sexual harassment, while men are not).
109. Id. at 189.
110. Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1153 (quoting Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of
Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984)); see
also MACKINNON, supra note 101, at 1 ("Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers
to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power.").
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under Title VII.'
Also important to the original concept of sexual harassment is
that it is a "group injury."' In other words, women suffer because
women as a group lack power, and men perpetrate female suffering
because men as a group have power."' Once again, whether this
reasoning can be used in same-sex sexual harassment cases is open to
debate.1
With this background of feminist legal theory and legislative
whim, sexual harassment has evolved in the judicial system into two
categories: quid pro quo and hostile work environment."' Quid pro
quo harassment "requires the employee to have submitted to
harassment as a condition of receiving job benefits or of retaining
employment.. 6  The United States Supreme Court has defined a
hostile work environment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature[,]"... whether or not it is directly related to the
grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where "such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably ...
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.""'
The requirements for claims based on hostile work environment are
similar to those for a claim based on quid pro quo harassment, except
that in hostile work environment cases, instead of having to show that
111. See infra notes 247-70 and accompanying text (discussing Professor MacKinnon's
and other legal theorists' views as to whether a same-sex sexual harassment claim should
lie under Title VII).
112. See Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1153-54.
113. See id. at 1153.
114. See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
115. See Shahan, supra note 73, at 511. Both categories may apply in the same case.
See Trish K. Murphy, Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. RuV. 1125, 1127 (1995).
116. Shahan, supra note 73, at 511. Elements of the quid pro quo claim are:
(1) the employee is a member of a protected group; (2) the employee was
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on
sex; (4) the receipt of employment benefit or a tangible job detriment expressly
or impliedly depended on the acceptance or rejection of the harassment by the
employee; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Murphy, supra note 115, at 1128; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909-10
(11th Cir. 1982) (describing the quid pro quo claim and its elements).
117. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1985)). In Meritor, a female employee alleged that a male supervisor
suggested they have sexual relations, "fondled her in front of other employees," and
forcibly raped her. Id. at 60.
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employment was dependent on sexual favors, the plaintiff/victim
must show that the harassment was severe enough to alter the
conditions of employment."' Courts addressing same-sex sexual
harassment have considered both types of claims."9
The Fourth Circuit considered same-sex hostile work
environment sexual harassment claims on two occasions prior to
Wrightson. First, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors,7' the court considered the plight of Mark McWilliams,
an automotive mechanic with cognitive and emotional disabilities
who was subjected to verbal and physical assaults with sexual
overtones by his male co-workers.121 The court affirmed summary
judgment for Fairfax County and held that a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII "does not lie where both the
alleged harassers and the victim are heterosexuals of the same sex.""
The court based its decision on the statutory language, " 'because of
the [claimant's] sex.' "" The court reasoned:
As a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in
common understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-
male-on-heterosexual-male conduct alleged here ... is
considered to be "because of the [target's] 'sex.'" Perhaps
"because of" the victim's known or believed prudery, or
shyness, or other form of vulnerability to sexually-focussed
[sic] speech or conduct. Perhaps "because of" the
perpetrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or
insecurity.... But not specifically "because of" the victim's
sex.
2 4
Expanding Title VII to such same-sex heterosexual claims, the
court reasoned, would extend the statute "to unmanageably broad
118. This element replaces the quid pro quo requirement that employment was
received in return for sexual favors. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1128-29 (describing
in detail requirements for a hostile work environment claim); Woodhouse, supra note 73,
at 1154-57 (same).
119. See supra note 77 (citing cases that discuss hostile work environment and quid pro
quo same-sex sexual harassment claims).
120. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
121. See ad at 1193-94. Co-workers teased McWilliams about his sexual activities and,
on one occasion, placed a condom in his food. See id. at 1193. At one point, they tied him
down and placed a finger in his mouth to simulate oral sex, and they fondled him on
another occasion. See id. The atmosphere of this all-male work environment was sexual,
with several off-color cartoons and Playboy centerfolds on the wall and radios tuned to
sexually explicit talk shows. See id
122. Id. at 1195. No claim was made that the harassers or McWilliams were
homosexual. See id.
123. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a)(1) (1994)) (alteration in original).
124. Id. at 1195-96 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)) (alterations in original).
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protection of the sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of
sex.' ,"' The court commented that while one may argue that there
should be such a law, "Title VII is not that law."''
However, the court noted that its reading of Title VII should not
be interpreted as overly restrictive. "[The] holding does not ...
purport to rule out claims of discrimination by adverse employment
decisions ... involving only same-sex heterosexual actors .... Nor,
most significantly, does it purport to reach any form of same-sex
discrimination claim where either victim or oppressor, or both, are
homosexual or bisexual... ."'2 The court explained that if Title VII
was interpreted to allow same-sex sexual harassment claims when
homosexuality was involved, "the fact of homosexuality... should be
considered an essential element of the claim, to be alleged and
proved."' 8
In dissent, Judge Michael took an opposite view, arguing that
while sexual orientation may be relevant, it should not be a required
element of a same-sex sexual harassment claim.129 He stated that
proof of sexual orientation would complicate Title VII, which, he
said, "is implicated whenever a person physically abuses a co-worker
for sexual satisfaction or propositions or pressures a co-worker out of
sexual interest or desire," regardless of the sexual orientation of
either."' Nevertheless, while the majority did not rule on the
homosexual same-sex sexual harassment issue, it held that same-sex
heterosexual-on-heterosexual hostile workplace harassment claims
would not lie under Title VII.
131
125. Id. at 1196.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1195 n.4. The court also noted that the Supreme Court had yet to address
the issue and that the lower federal courts were "hopelessly divided." Id. (citing Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (surveying the conflicting
decisions on the issue)).
128. Id. at 1195 n.5.
129. See id. at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
130. Id (Michael, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 1195. The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this position in Mayo v. Kiwest
Corp., No. 95-2638, 1996 WL 460769, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1996) (per curiam). In
Mayo, a male employee alleged that his supervisor, Flanagan, also a male, verbally and
physically sexually assaulted him, creating a hostile work environment. See id. at *1. The
harassment included vulgar comments, as well as suggestions of oral sex and comments
that the other employees believed that Mayo was homosexual. See id. Flanagan allegedly
kissed Mayo on the cheek, fondled his genitals and poked his anal area with a wooden
dowel. See ia The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Title VII. See id. at *3. The court followed McWilliams, see id. at *3-
*4, concluding that no cause of action under Title VII would lie because "both Mayo and
Flanagan were indisputably males and Mayo makes no claim that either was homosexual
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Just two months later, the Fourth Circuit decided Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.," another same-sex sexual harassment
case. A male photographic technician, George E. Hopkins, Jr.,
alleged that his supervisor, Ira Swadow, had subjected him to
discriminatory sexual harassment that created a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII.' The court did not decide
whether Hopkins's same-sex sexual harassment claim was actionable
under Title VII, but instead held that Hopkins had failed to
demonstrate "that Swadow's alleged harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment and [that] the harassment was directed at him because
of his sex.""'  Even though a discussion of the actionability of Title
VII same-sex sexual harassment was unnecessary for the Hopkins
decision, Judge Niemeyer spoke directly to the issue as he wrote for
the court.135 In a part of the decision in which the rest of the court did
not concur, he discussed the EEOC's position that the sexes of both
the harasser and the victim are irrelevant in determining whether
Title VII has been violated." After briefly describing a number of
decisions on similar issues of same-sex sexual harassment, Judge
Niemeyer "conclude[d] that sexual harassment of a male employee,
whether by another male or by a female, may be actionable under
Title VII if the basis for the harassment is because the employee is a
man,"'3 7 but that the "employee's sexual behavior, prudery, or
vulnerability" would not form the basis of a Title VII claim.- 8 He
acknowledged that a claim of same-sex sexual harassment would be
or bisexual." Id. at *4.
132. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
133. See id at 747. Hopkins alleged in part that Swadow had made a number of
sexually suggestive comments. See id. at 747-48.
134. Id. at 753. In particular, the court found that the incidents were too far apart in
time, that Swadow's acts were ambiguous, that a number of the incidents occurred in the
presence of a group, and that only in Hopkins's subjective view were Swadow's acts
directed toward Hopkins alone. See id at 753-54.
135. See id at 748-52. Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Hamilton expressed
reservations about Judge Niemeyer's decision to write on the issue. See id at 755
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in part). Instead, they followed the reasoning in McWilliams.
See id (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in part) (citing McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195); see also
supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text (discussing McWilliams). Moreover, they
concluded that "[i]f Title VII is to be extended to cover a whole new generation of same
sex harassment claims, it is far better that it be accomplished by legislative action than by
judicial fiat." Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 755 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in part).
136. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 750 (discussing EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3)
(Nov. 10, 1980)).
137. Id. at 752.
13& Id. at 751-52; see also McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196 (declaring that prohibition of
discrimination based on "sex" in Title VII does not cover prudishness or sexual behavior).
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difficult to prove because there is a general presumption that when a
man harasses another man (or a woman harasses another woman), it
is not because of his (or her) sex.39 However, Judge Niemeyer
continued, if the harassed employee can prove that the harasser acted
out of sexual attraction, most likely with some kind of homosexual
intent, then this evidence could be used to show that the action was
directed at him because he was male.1" In such cases, he concluded,
but only in those cases, a Title VII action may exist. 4'
Thus, prior to Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit had not recognized
a same-sex sexual harassment claim under Title VII for a hostile
work environment based on heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male
harassment.142 But the Fourth Circuit had suggested on two occasions
that homosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male harassment might be
actionable under Title VII.V'43 Ultimately, in Wrightson, the court
took the next step and found a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment for a hostile work environment under Title VII when the
perpetrator is homosexual.1"
Since Wrightson, three other circuit courts have held that
allegations of same-sex sexual harassment based on a hostile work
environment are actionable under Title VII in certain circumstances.
In Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville,45 the Sixth Circuit allowed
139. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752. Judge Niemeyer explained that the opposite
presumption would exist if a man harassed a woman or a woman harassed a man. See id.
140. See id. Judge Niemeyer described evidence of homosexuality as principal
evidence of sexual harassment, but not the only suitable evidence. See id.; see also
McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n.5 (discussing the consequences of requiring or not
requiring homosexuality as an element of a same-sex sexual harassment claim).
141. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752-53.
142. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196. McWilliams and Hopkins are the only cases on
same-sex sexual harassment in the Fourth Circuit prior to Wrightson; therefore, they
provide a summary of the circuit's history on the subject.
143. See id. at 1195 n.4 ("We therefore specifically reserve decision on the general
question whether, when all the actors involved in a Title VII claim of sex-discrimination
(in any of its forms) are of the same sex, the homosexuality of any may make the claim
nevertheless cognizable as one of 'discrimination because of [the victim's] sex.' "). In
Hopkins, Judge Niemeyer, writing only for himself, reasoned that a same-sex sexual
harassment claim would be viable if the plaintiff could prove that the harasser acted with
homosexual intent. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 ("[A] male employee who undertakes to
prove sexual harassment directed at him by another male may use evidence of the
harasser's homosexuality to demonstrate that the action was directed at him because he is
a man." (citing McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n.5)).
144. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141.
145. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997). Yeary was the Sixth Circuit's first direct discussion
of same-sex sexual harassment. See id. at 446; see also Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81
F.3d 48, 49-50 (6th Cir.) (finding no cause of action for a same-sex sexual harassment
claim because of the plaintiff's failure to assert that his employer knew or should have
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a same-sex sexual harassment claim when the plaintiff alleged that
the harassment occurred due to sex. In a situation similar to
Wrightson, Yeary, a male employee, alleged that a male homosexual
co-worker had harassed him at work.1" Yeary complained to
management, was terminated, and subsequently filed an action for
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII.147 The court determined
that "this case is about as traditional as they come, albeit with a twist.
It is about an employee making sexual propositions to and physically
assaulting a coworker because, it appears, he finds that coworker
sexually attractive."1" The court reasoned that in order to state a
claim for these acts under Title VII, like any other claim under Title
VII, the plaintiff must allege that he or she was harassed " 'because
of... sex.' ,149 The court found that Yeary had stated such a claim.'o
"He claims that because he is a male, he was subjected to
objectionable treatment to which women employees ... were not
subjected.... If true, this creates an institutional disadvantage for
Yeary in working at Goodwill, simply by virtue of the fact that he is a
man.
151
The Sixth Circuit declined to limit its holding to situations where
the harasser is homosexual, stating instead that "all that is necessary
for us to observe is that when a male sexually propositions another
male because of sexual attraction, there can be little question that the
behavior is a form of harassment that occurs because the
propositioned male is a male-that is, 'because of ... sex.' ,,152 Thus,
the Sixth Circuit has introduced the because-of-sex standard for
same-sex sexual harassment but has yet to define its parameters.
In Fredette v. BVP Management Associates,5 1 the Eleventh
Circuit, much like the Fourth Circuit in Wrightson, held that the
sexual harassment of a male employee by a homosexual male
supervisor is actionable under Title VII.' Robert Fredette, a waiter,
known about the harassment, not because both the victim and the perpetrator were
male), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 170, and reh'g denied, 117 S. Ct. 598 (1996).
146. See Yeary, 107 F.3d at 443-44. Yeary alleged that the homosexual co-worker
asked him for a date, spoke to him suggestively, and touched him in a sexual manner. See
id.
147. See id. at 444.
148. Id. at 447-48. The court made the point that the allegations would certainly be
actionable if the victim and the perpetrator had been of different sexes. See id. at 448.
149. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
153. 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
154. See id. at 1510.
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alleged that he had experienced both quid pro quo and hostile work
environment sexual harassment due to the sexual propositions of his
manager, Dana Sunshine, a homosexual male." The court limited its
discussion to the homosexual-on-heterosexual fact pattern and
determined that Title VII did not require the perpetrator and the
victim to be opposite genders and further that "'because of such
individual's ... sex'" could apply when a homosexual male harassed
a heterosexual male.' 6 Interestingly, the court recognized the Fourth
Circuit's sharp distinction between a homosexual perpetrator as in
Wrightson and a heterosexual perpetrator as in McWilliams.' After
doing so, the Eleventh Circuit declined to draw such a distinction
because it was unnecessary to decide the case, but the court did state
that the Fourth Circuit's homosexual/heterosexual distinction was
"easily perceived."'58 Furthermore, in stating its reasoning behind
allowing the Title VII action, the court rejected the "power" notion
of sexual harassment by finding that an allegation of an environment
dominated by the opposite gender was unnecessary to state the
claim."5 The court also carefully distinguished its holding from one
that would allow an action based on sexual orientation."w Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit reached conclusions very similar to those reached by
the Fourth Circuit in Wrightson.
In Quick v. Donaldson Co.,6' the Eighth Circuit applied Title
VII to same-sex sexual harassment even more broadly than the Sixth,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits by holding that Phil Quick, a
heterosexual male, had a cause of action under Title VII for sexual
harassment perpetrated by his heterosexual male co-workers.'6" The
harassment of Quick included "bagging,"1 physical assault, and
155. See U. at 1504. Fredette presented evidence that when he refused Sunshine's
advances, Sunshine retaliated against him in "work-related ways." See id.
156. Id. at 1504-06 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1)). The court analogized a
homosexual male's motives toward another male to a heterosexual male's motives toward
a woman. See id. at 1505-06. But see infra notes 297-308 and accompanying text
(discussing why focusing on the perpetrator's motives may be misguided).
157. See Frederie, 112 F.3d at 1506-07.
158. Id.
159. See U4. at 1509; see also infra notes 247-64 and accompanying text (discussing the
"power" notion of sexual harassment).
160. See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510.
161. 90F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
162. See id. at 1379. This differs from the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that only
homosexual-on-heterosexual claims of same-sex sexual harassment are viable under Title
VII. See supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text (discussing Wrightson's majority
opinion).
163. Bagging typically involves an action aimed at a man's groin. See Quick, 90 F.3d at
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verbal harassment, particularly "taunting about being homosexual."1'
The court below granted summary judgment to Quick's employer on
the Title VII claim, concluding that "Title VII protects a male
employee from discriminatory sexual harassment only where he can
show an anti-male or predominantly female environment making
males a disadvantaged or vulnerable group."1"
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Quick satisfied the five
requirements necessary to state a cause of action for hostile work
environment under Title VII: "'"(1) [he] belongs to a protected
group; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) [the employer] knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper
remedial action... .' First, the court decided that Quick satisfied
the initial factor by being a man, and thus a member of a protected
group. 67 Second, it noted that Congress had intentionally left the
scope of sexual harassment broad and that Quick's allegations
constituted unwelcome sexual harassment." Third, the court stated
that harassment is "based upon sex" only if "'members of one sex
are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed.' ,,69 Here, this
factor was met because only men were subjected to the bagging and
other harassment.Y7 Fourth, the court interpreted Title VII as
covering discrimination that is "' "sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
1379. Quick defined bagging as the "grabbing and squeezing of another person's
testicles." IaL A supervisor described bagging as common at Quick's workplace. See id.
164. Id. On one occasion, a co-worker held Quick down while another worker
squeezed his left testicle, resulting in swelling and bruising. See id. at 1375.
165. Id. at 1375-76.
166. Id. at 1377 (quoting Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir.
1992))).
167. See id. Under Title VII, both men and women are protected groups for the
purpose of sex discrimination. See id. The court rejected the district court's contention
that Title VII is limited to disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. See id. at 1378.
16& See id at 1377. The court stated that whether the harassment is unwelcome is a
question for the trier of fact, based largely on the plaintiffs conduct. See id- at 1378.
Further, to show that the harassment was sexual, the plaintiff does not have to show
sexual innuendo; instead, all the facts should be considered "in the totality of the
circumstances." Id at 1379.
169. Id at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring)).
170. In this case, there was evidence that the women at the place of employment had
not had their genitals grabbed; that is, they had not been subjected to the female
equivalent of "bagging." See id. at 1376, 1379.
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working environment."' "",' The court added that the nature of the
environment must be determined from the entire record." The court
stated that on this issue, Quick had presented enough details to
create a question for the jury."" Finally, the court held that Quick's
allegations were also sufficient to satisfy the fifth element: that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment.' 4
In dissent, Judge Nangle, relying on McWilliams, argued that
heterosexual-on-heterosexual harassment should not create a cause
of action under Title VII.' He believed that the majority's opinion
improperly enlarged "Title VII to cover any form of harassment
experienced in the workplace.""17 While he admitted that Quick
maintained that the bagging was widespread, whereas McWilliams
had argued that he was a particular target of the harassment, Judge
Nangle concluded that the two situations were similar because Quick
appeared to have been singled out for harassment as well.'7
According to Judge Nangle, in order for Quick to show that he was
subjected to a hostile work environment, the harassment would need
to have been so pervasive as to actually alter the conditions of
employment.'
Finally, Judge Nangle cautioned the majority against using
previous Eighth Circuit Title VII cases to decide same-sex cases. The
earlier cases all involved men harassing women; Judge Nangle argued
that the inferences were different.79 He concluded:
[I]n the traditional situation [of a man harassing a woman],
"[t]he causal link between the supervisor's conduct and the
victim's harassment is the victim's gender.... In a same-
gender sexual harassment case, however, conduct of a
sexual or gender-oriented nature can not be presumed to be
discriminatory.... When the alleged offender and the
171. Id. at 1378 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986))).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1379.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1380 (Nangle, J., dissenting) (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd.
of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996)).
176. Id. (Nangle, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 1380-81 (Nangle, J., dissenting). Because a hostile work environment
claim "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment,'" a claimant must show a
hostile environment, not just an isolated incident. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57,67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
178. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1381 (Nangle, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (Nangle, J., dissenting).
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alleged victim share the same gender, similar sexually
suggestive words and acts can take on a whole other
meaning. 1)8
For example, he stated, if actions similar to bagging were done to
females by males, there would be an inference of sexual harassment,
but if done by a heterosexual male to another heterosexual male,
there is only an inference of vulgarity.'
Thus, in addition to the Fourth Circuit, three other circuits have
allowed an action for same-sex sexual harassment. However, the
cases differ from Wrightson in important ways. In Yeary, for
example, the Sixth Circuit held that a cause of action exists for same-
sex sexual harassment under Title VII as long as the harassment
occurs due to sex.' While the Sixth Circuit in Yeary considered a
male-homosexual-on-male-heterosexual case, it declined to conclude,
as did the Fourth Circuit in Wrightson, that a same-sex sexual
harassment claim could only exist when the harasser was
homosexual." Similarly, in Fredette, the Eleventh Circuit
"perceived" the Fourth Circuit's distinction between homosexual and
heterosexual perpetrators and held that a victim harassed by a
homosexual could state a claim under Title VII but did not explicitly
follow the Fourth Circuit's homosexual/heterosexual distinction."
Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit expressly expanded same-sex sexual
harassment to include heterosexual-on-heterosexual claims.' Thus,
the Fourth Circuit's Wrightson decision requiring a homosexual
perpetrator is narrower than the Eighth Circuit's decision, which
allows the victim of a heterosexual perpetrator to state a claim.
While the aforementioned circuits have shown a willingness to
find some federal cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment, at
least one circuit has refused to recognize any same-sex sexual
harassment claims under Title VII."V In Garcia v. ElfAtochem North
180. Id. (Nangle, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Easton v. Crossland
Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1382-83 (C.D. Cal. 1995)).
181. See id. (Nangle, J., dissenting). Judge Nangle did not consider what the inference
would be if one of the men had been homosexual. Presumably then, there would once
again have been an inference of sexual harassment.
182. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443,448 (6th Cir. 1997).
183. See id. ("It is not necessary for this court to decide today whether same-sex
sexual harassment can be actionable only when the harasser is a homosexual .... ).
184. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1997).
185. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
186. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir.)
(holding that no same-sex sexual harassment occurred when heterosexual man was
threatened and assaulted by two other men), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc
denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997); Garcia v. Elf
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America,"' the Fifth Circuit considered allegations by Freddy Garcia,
a heterosexual male, that his plant foreman, Rayford Locke, had
sexually harassed him by grabbing his groin and making sexual
motions behind him.as Garcia complained to the union steward, and
Locke was reprimanded by the employer."9 Garcia subsequently
filed a complaint under Title VII.' The district court granted
summary judgment to Garcia's employer and Locke; the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, finding that Garcia was not entitled to redress under Title
VII.19' Judge Garwood, writing for the court, explained the basis for
the decision by stating that "'[h]arassment by a male supervisor
against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII
even though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII
addresses gender discrimination.' "9
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit revisited same-sex sexual
harassment under Title VII in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.93 Joseph Oncale alleged a series of severe incidents of
sexual harassment by his male supervisor and two male co-workers
while they were working for Sundowner on an offshore rig.9 Due to
the harassment, Oncale quit his job and filed suit, alleging both
Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that no sexual harassment
occurred when male employees were harassed by male supervisor).
187. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
188. See id. at 448.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 449.
191. See iL at 449-50.
192. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
576, 576 (Dec. 6, 1993)). First, the court found that Garcia could seek only equitable
relief under Title VII because the alleged violations had occurred before the damages
portion of Title VII became effective. See id. at 450. Because Garcia had continued to
work for the company and Locke had left, the court also held that neither back pay nor
injunctive relief was appropriate. See id Moreover, the court found that Garcia failed to
establish a prima facie case against any of the defendants. See id It concluded that no
same-sex sexual harassment claim could lie under Title VII. See id. at 451-52. Because of
its ruling on the lack of relief available to Garcia, the court did not have to reach the issue
of same-sex sexual harassment. In Oncale, however, the Fifth Circuit considered the
conclusion in Garcia-that no same-sex sexual harassment claim lies under Title VII-to
be binding. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir.),
reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 2430 (1997); see also infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text (discussing
Oncale).
193. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 95 F.3d 56
(5th Cir. 1996), cerL granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
194. See id. at 118-19. Oncale alleged that two co-workers held him down while a
supervisor placed his penis on Oncale's neck; that co-workers threatened him with
homosexual rape; and that one co-worker forced a bar of soap into his anus as another
one restrained him while he was taking a shower on Sundowner's premises. See id.
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hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment.19
Relying on Garcia, the district court granted summary judgment to
Sundowner, the defendant.196
In affirming the. district court's decision in Oncale, the Fifth
Circuit determined that Garcia's bar on all male-on-male same-sex
sexual harassment claims under Title VII was binding precedent.'
Yet the Fifth Circuit appeared to find some merit in Oncale's claim
and in the amicus curiae brief filed on his behalf by the EEOC.98
The court recognized that under one reading of the statute, "so long
as the plaintiff proves that the harassment is because of the victim's
sex, the sex of the harasser and victim is irrelevant. '" ' 9 However, the
court concluded that it was compelled to reject this line of reasoning
because of Garcia.2 In December 1996, the Supreme Court asked
the United States Department of Justice to submit a brief on the
subject of same-sex sexual harassment to aid the Court in its
certiorari decision in Oncale." Subsequently, on June 9, 1997, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.m Supreme Court resolution of
Oncale will help to clarify the applicability of Title VII in same-sex
sexual harassment situations.
Other circuit courts that have not squarely addressed the issue of
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII have, nevertheless,
suggested their positions in dicta. The First Circuit ruled that a male
heterosexual who alleged that a male homosexual co-worker made
sexual advances toward him did have a cause of action for sexual
harassment under Title VII.w3 However, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to show that the co-worker's harassment was
"sufficiently severe [or] adequately pervasive to amount to the type
of conduct deemed to be actionable under Title VII."2''
One judge in the Second Circuit has suggested that the court
might consider a same-sex sexual harassment claim under Title VII. 5
195. See id. at 119.
196. See id. (citing Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52).
197. See id. at 119-20 (citing Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52).
19& See U at 119.
199. 1d
200. See iUL
201. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 607, 607 (1996) (inviting
the Solicitor General to submit a brief expressing the views of the United States).
202. 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
203. See Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186,192 (1st Cir. 1990).
204. Id. Thus, the court never had to rule conclusively on the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment, but instead it looked at the sufficiency of the claim generally. See id.
205. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van
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Judge Van Graafeiland took issue with the misconception that only
sexual harassment of women constituted disparate treatment because
of sex. 6 He concluded that "harassment is harassment regardless of
whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex."'
Thus, he opened the door to a possible same-sex sexual harassment
claim.
The Seventh Circuit has also strongly suggested that a same-sex
sexual harassment claim can be made under Title VII. In Baskerville
v. Culligan International Co.,3 Judge Posner, writing for the court,
discussed the behavior that Title VII was intended to deter.' He
explained: "Sexual harassment of women by men is the most
common kind, but we do not mean to exclude the possibility that
sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or
women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate
cases."2 ' Similarly, in McDonnell v. Cisneros,I1 Judge Posner, again
writing for the court, observed that "[a]nalysis [of Title VII] is
complicated by the fact that a difference in sex is not a necessary
condition of sexual activity and hence (most courts think) of sexual
harassment. 212 In particular, the court discussed the possibility that
with homosexual and bisexual harassers, harassment could still occur
on the basis of sex.213
The Ninth Circuit has also suggested the possibility of a same-
sex sexual harassment claim under Title VII.2 4  In Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 215 the court considered a Title VII suit by a
woman who claimed sexual harassment by her male supervisor.2 6
Graafeiland, J., concurring).
206. See id. (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
207. Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
208. 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
209. See id. at 430-32.
210. Id. at 430. Baskerville concerned a female employee allegedly being harassed by
a male supervisor. See id.
211. 84F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
212. Id at 260.
213. See id. In McDonnell, both a male and female worker claimed Title VII was
violated when their employer accused them of improper sexual relations and conducted
an investigation that resulted in new rumors about lurid sexual activity on their part. See
id at 257-58. The court ruled that Title VII did not apply. See id. at 257-59.
214. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994)
(declining to find that both male and female employees cannot have a claim against a
male supervisor); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1507-08, 1515-16 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding an employer liable for sexual harassment of a female employee by both
female and male supervisors).
215. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
216. See id. at 1462.
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The evidence revealed that the supervisor harassed both men and
women.217 While this harassment did not diminish the plaintiff's
claim, the court asserted that "we do not rule out the possibility that
both men and women working at [the place of employment] have
viable claims against [the male supervisor] for sexual harassment., 218
Another case, EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,1 involved harassment of a
female, by both men and women supervisors.' While the court did
not specifically address the same-sex issue, it found the employer
liable for sexual harassment by both.221
The District of Columbia Circuit has focused on homosexuality
as the key to same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII.' In
Barnes v. Costle,22 the court noted in dicta that Title VII would be
implicated whether the claimed harassment was by a heterosexual
male against a heterosexual female, by a heterosexual female against
a heterosexual male, or "upon a subordinate of either gender by a
homosexual superior of the same gender."'  But the court
distinguished the case of a bisexual superior harasser because in such
instances "the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute
gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female
employees alike."' That is, if a bisexual harasses both men and
women, neither the men nor the women can claim they were harassed
specifically "because of sex," because the other sex was also harassed.
Thus, someone who harasses both sexes, such as a bisexual harasser,
has been dubbed an "equal opportunity harasser. '
217. See id.
218. Id. at 1464. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination cannot be extended to sexual preference discrimination, that is,
discrimination against homosexuals. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,
329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
219. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
220. See id. at 1507.
221. See id. at 1515-16.
222. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that
regardless of the sex of the harassing supervisor, the issue is whether the harassment
would have occurred if the employee had been of a different sex).
223. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
224. Id. at 990 n.55.
225. Id. Thus, harassment by a homosexual would be gender discrimination only if the
homosexual targeted persons of only one sex.
226. Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in
Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. RaV. 1013, 1026-27 (1996). This issue
further complicates the same-sex sexual harassment debate and is beyond the scope of
this Note. See generally idi (explaining the inadequacies of the but-for test for bisexual
harassers specifically and for same-sex sexual harassment more generally, and suggesting
a move to a gender-dominance paradigm).
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Overall, these cases demonstrate that the circuit courts have
approached the issue of same-sex sexual harassment from a number
of perspectives and with varying degrees of certainty, creating
considerable confusion in the process. While the courts have
considered a number of issues in determining whether a same-sex
sexual harassment claim will lie under Title VII, the confusion
apparently centers around the meaning of "because of sex" in Title
VII."7 In Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit described "because of sex" as
"but for sex," and concluded that only a homosexual could harass a
heterosexual of the same sex but for sex, but that two heterosexuals
of the same sex could not harass one another but for sex.m2 In Yeary,
the Sixth Circuit relied on Title ViI's "because of sex" language as
well but did not interpret it as "but for sex."22' 9 Instead, the court left
the language intact and concluded that a homosexual could harass a
heterosexual due to sex;m however, it did not resolve the issue of
whether two heterosexuals could harass one another due to sex.
Taking a different approach, the Eleventh Circuit, in Fredette, used
the language "because of sex" as well and then used hypotheticals to
define its meaning: (1) a heterosexual male harassing a female is
"because of sex"; and (2) a homosexual male harassing a male is
"because of sex."231 However, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the heterosexual male harassing a male hypothetical was "a more
difficult question, both in terms of common experience and law," and
thus, the court did not decide whether that harassment was also
"because of sex."2 2  Attempting to answer this same difficult
question, the Eighth Circuit defined "because of sex" as "based on
sex"; harassment is "based on sex" when "'members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed.' "3 That court
allowed a cause of action in a case involving the alleged harassment
227. See generally Christopher W. Deering, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment" A Need
to Re-Examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII's Ban on Discrimination "Because of'
Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 256-65 (1997) (explaining the different "because-of-sex"
approaches by courts in considering same-sex sexual harassment).
228. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142 (discussing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996)).
229. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997)
(referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
230. See U4.
231. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997).
232- Id at 1507.
233. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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of a heterosexual male by another heterosexual male. 2 On the other
end of the spectrum, the Fifth Circuit has found that Title VII does
not prohibit same-sex sexual harassment because Title VII deals only
with gender discrimination.25 Thus, for the Fifth Circuit, "because of
sex" apparently cannot be found in any same-sex situation."6
Because the other circuit courts have yet to rule explicitly on the
issue of same-sex sexual harassment, it is difficult to discern and
categorize their reasoning. The First Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit have suggested that harassment of a heterosexual
by a homosexual of the same sex can raise a Title VII cause of
action." Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit has expressly stated that
"because of sex" would include harassment of heterosexuals by
homosexuals and bisexuals.'s The Second and Ninth Circuits,
however, have not differentiated between homosexuals and
heterosexuals in their statements concerning same-sex sexual
harassment. A judge in the Second Circuit simply observed that
harassment may be caused by members of the same sex,' " and the
Ninth Circuit, without discussion on the issue, has not ruled out
same-sex sexual harassment claims that do not include allegations of
homosexuality.2'
In summary, some circuit courts have considered the harasser's
sexual orientation to be important to the same-sex sexual harassment
issue, while others have not. The Wrightson decision signifies that
the harasser's sexual orientation is critical to the Fourth Circuit.241 By
emphasizing the harasser's sexual orientation, the court has added
greatly to the judicial discourse on same-sex sexual harassment.
Perhaps some of the confusion among the circuits on same-sex
sexual harassment is due to the language of Title VII itself. When
statutory language is plain, the courts must enforce the statute
according to its terms.' Unfortunately, the "sex" language in Title
234. See id. at 1374.
235. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
236. See infra notes 266-84 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of
gender and sexual orientation in sexual harassment claims).
237. See Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (lst Cir. 1990);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
238. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256,260 (7th Cir. 1995).
239. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van
Graafeiland, J., concurring).
240. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994); EEOC
v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
241. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141.
242. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917).
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VII, coupled with its sparse legislative history, offers little if any
guidance.l 3 In Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
perpetrator and victim of the harassment may be of either sex, and
may in fact, be the same sex.2 The Fourth Circuit does have support
from other courts for this conclusion. 5 In fact, one commentator has
argued that "[n]othing in the statute's plain language, its legislative
history, or the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation indicates that
Title VII's coverage of sexual harassment is restricted to situations
where the victim and the harasser are members of different
genders." 24
Just as the confusion may be partially attributed to the language
of the statute, the solution may lie in the history of the claim itself.
The origin and development of sexual harassment is richer than the
plain language of the statute and its legislative history.247 While the
Wrightson court did not consider this basic history of sexual
harassment directly, that history can still be used to illuminate the
theoretical viability of the same-sex sexual harassment claim under
Title VII as announced by Wrightson. According to the power theory
of sexual harassment, "sexual harassment stems from the imbalance
of power between men and women in society."2 m Thus, sexual
243. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has
recognized this lack of legislative history as a source of the conflict in the federal courts
over same-sex sexual harassment. See Levay, supra note 82, at 1613 ("The conflicting
positions are likely due, in part, to the shortage of legislative history available to guide the
courts.").
244. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142.
245. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (arguing
that one may not discriminate against a man or woman solely because of gender); Griffith
v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Il1. 1995) (stating that Title
VII does not require that the perpetrator and the victim of sexual harassment be of
different genders); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232
(S.D. Ga. 1995) (same); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp.
1545,1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (same).
246. Murphy, supra note 115, at 1137.
247. See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of
Catharine MacKinnon and her theories of sexual harassment).
248. Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1153. Professor Katherine T. Bartlett, one
reviewer of Catharine MacKinnon's power theory, has summarized it in this way:
Her theory is this: men have power over everything of value in society, even the
power to decide what has value and what does not. Men use this power
systemically to shape and define the social beings we call men and women in
ways which enhance the power of men and keep women subordinate to men.
How men have constructed the relationship between men and women in turn
shapes and constructs society as a whole such that each of its constitutive parts-
its law, its institutions, the private relationships it fosters-is organized
hierarchically by sex.
Katherine T. Bartlett, Review of MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75
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harassment is the use of this power "'to impose ... the sexual
demands or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person.' ,249
In same-sex sexual harassment, when the harasser and the victim are
of the same sex, the power imbalance apparently no longer stems
from the power imbalance between men and women.m
The question then becomes whether this lack of male-female
power imbalance should be fatal to a same-sex sexual harassment
claim.21 For the Fourth Circuit, it apparently was not. By allowing a
same-sex sexual harassment claim, the Fourth Circuit rejected this
single-faceted interpretation of the power theory justification for the
viability of a claim.z2 There are several arguments to support the
Fourth Circuit's apparent conclusion that the power theory is not
necessarily single-faceted. One argument asserts that "males, as well
as females, can claim that they are victims of the stereotypical roles
impressed upon them by a society that has historically repressed
women."' 3  Thus, males as well as females can claim that their
CAL. L. REv. 1559, 1559 (1987) (reviewing MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, su1pra
note 105).
249. Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1153 (quoting Note, supra note 110, at 1451).
250. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In Goluszek, the
court stated that the sexual harassment that is actionable under Title VII "'is the
exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling
but less powerful person.'" Id. (quoting Note, supra note 110, at 1451-52). The court
found that no claim existed because the male plaintiff did not work in an environment
that treated men as inferior and thus was not harassed "because of sex." See id. See
generally Grose, supra note 101, at 383 (describing more fully the Goluzsek opinion and
its relation to the power theory).
251. In Goluszek, the court found the power issue to be very important as the court
determined that Congress had enacted Title VII because Congress was concerned with
"an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which results in
discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group." Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
In the case of a male harassed in a male-dominated environment, no imbalance of power
exists; thus, there is no Title VII action. See id.
252. E. Gary Spitko asserts that the split between courts that find a cause of action for
same-sex sexual harassment and those that do not can be directly connected to Professor
MacKinnon's theories. See Spitko, supra note 73, at 66. Spitko argues that courts using a
"but for" test have followed Professor MacKinnon's differences theory because they find
that the victim is treated differently but for his or her sex. See id. Wrightson is an
example of this reasoning. On the other hand, the courts that have not found a cause of
action for same-sex sexual harassment have followed Professor MacKinnon's inequality
theory, reasoning that same-sex sexual harassment "does not degrade the victim on the
basis of his or her sex." Id. at 66-67.
253. Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1169. "[Mien 'are forced always to maintain an
aura of invincibility and machismo; to shoulder responsibility for dependent women and
children; to be enslaved to economic necessity for most of their adult lives; and to die
early for their efforts.'" Id. (quoting Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333,348 (1990)).
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harassment stems from the male-female power imbalance.2
Another argument is based upon the recognition that the courts,
in setting out the requirements of a sexual harassment claim, have
never required a claim to state that a dominant group discriminated
against a disempowered one." Therefore, the power theory may be
relevant only as historical fact and not as legal necessity. In parallel
support of this hypothesis, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is
immaterial whether the discrimination is against majorities or
minorities in cases concerning religion and race.26  If this were
untrue, men and whites could not win discrimination cases, when in
fact they do." Furthermore, courts do not require social
disempowerment as an element of sexual harassment."
Finally, an argument can be made that power continues to play a
role in same-sex sexual harassment. While, as discussed above, the
power relationship may be practically unnecessary to prove a Title
VII claim, it does tie the same-sex sexual harassment issue to its
feminist roots and the original theoretical arguments for sexual
harassment. One commentator has argued that in the same-sex
sexual harassment context, "[tlhe only power involved may be that of
sheer force or manipulation," but that such power should be
254. See id.
255. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1140-42.
256. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977) (holding, in
a case involving discrimination on the basis of religion, that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against both minorities and majorities); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding, in a race discrimination case, that by enacting Title VII,
Congress intended to prohibit discriminatory preferences for any group, majority or
minority).
257. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1140-41. In fact, Professor Ruth Colker has
argued that men and whites actually have an easier burden in discrimination suits than
their less empowered counterparts. See Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women,
Surly Blacks, and Competent Heterosexual White Men The Sexual and Racial Morality
Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 197-98 (1995).
In the area of race, for example, Professor Colker notes that "[c]omparing discrimination
cases brought by minorities and reverse discrimination cases brought by non-minorities
reveals that courts are exceedingly strict with determination of causation in the former,
but quite generous with determination of causation in the latter." Id. at 217. Similarly, in
the area of sexual harassment, she concludes that women with heterosexualized claims
have the best chance of winning. See id. at 205.
258. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1141. For example, in the Fourth Circuit, hostile
work environment sexual harassment can be shown by proving. "(1) that [an employee]
was harassed 'because of' his 'sex'; (2) that the harassment was unwelcome; (3) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working
environment; and (4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer."
Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142.
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adequate for a Title VII claim based on an imbalance of power." 9
More importantly, feminist writers themselves have recognized that
power imbalances can exist beyond male dominance. For example,
Professor MacKinnon noted that "[a] woman who is fired because of
her refusal to submit to a lesbian supervisor is just as fired-and her
firing is just as related to her gender-as if the perpetrator were a
man." That is, "women who have assumed traditional male power
roles behave like men."' ' Thus, for Professor MacKinnon, it appears
that a same-sex sexual harassment claim would be viable even under
the power theory. 2
However, not all legal theorists are as willing to see the power
theory as multi-faceted in order to support same-sex sexual
harassment. One theory is that power imbalances between men and
women are intrinsically different from other power imbalances in the
workplace.' Carolyn Grose argues even more strongly that if
women "insist that 'harassment' of women by women on the job is a
form of gender discrimination because the women harassers have
assumed positions of male superiority, we serve only to entrench our
subordination and deny any alternative reality we might experience
free from our relationships with men. '
Because the Wrightson court found a claim for same-sex sexual
harassment, it presumably either followed the reasoning that power is
not a necessary part of the sexual harassment theory or merely
concluded that a power imbalance did indeed exist in the case.m As
in Professor MacKinnon's woman-on-woman example, courts faced
with man-on-man harassment could argue that the male harassers
place the male victim in the position of the female and thus create a
259. Shahan, supra note 73, at 527.
260. MACKINNON, supra note 101, at 206.
261. Grose, supra note 101, at 384. Grose, however, argues that Professor
MacKinnon's theory leaves out the lesbian experience and thus fails to recognize that in a
workplace (or relationship) with no men, the power dynamics between women would be
much different. See id. at 384-85.
262. Professor MacKinnon clearly asserted this viewpoint when E. Gary Spitko
requested her opinion on his article. See Spitko, supra note 73, at 72 n.79. She responded
that same-sex sexual harassment is harassment on the basis of sex. See id. For her
criticism of his theory, see id.
263. See Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1168 ("Persons of the same gender usually do
not suffer from the same imbalance of power that is present between males and
females.").
264. Grose, supra note 101, at 385.
265. The court did not discuss this issue, but its decision to allow the claim will
certainly be interpreted to have some implications for the role of power in sexual
harassment cases.
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power imbalance. Or the courts could assert that the power stems
from the ability to manipulate the employment environment and that
alone it is adequate to state a claim.
Besides the power theory of sexual harassment, the concept that
sexual harassment is a group injury, with women traditionally being
the injured group, must also be overcome in the case of same-sex
sexual harassment, either because women are not the injured group
(men-on-men) or because women are both the injured group and the
perpetrator of the injury (women-on-women). 7 However, while
theoretically based on a premise of group injury, Title VII focuses on
the individual bringing the claim.' Moreover, the Supreme Court
has stated that discrimination does not have to be directed at an
entire group, but rather at the individual.z9 Therefore, the group
injury theory is not likely to be fatal to finding a same-sex sexual
harassment claim under Title VII.
Thus, while it is debatable whether Wrightson adhered to
Professor MacKinnon's original theory of sexual harassment, it
would appear that any deviations from the theory would be unlikely
to preclude a same-sex sexual harassment claim under Title VII.
That is, the development of sexual harassment doctrine in the courts
can permit the expansion of the theoretical underpinnings of sexual
harassment to include same-sex sexual harassment.'
The Wrightson decision, however, does produce some
controversy. Wrightson's conclusion that the existence of a same-sex
266. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing the salience of group
injury to sexual harassment).
267. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Il. 1988) (ruling against a
man who claimed discrimination in a male-dominated working environment).
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see also supra notes 78-85 and
accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements).
269. See City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978)
(finding the statute's focus on the individual to be "unambiguous"); Murphy, supra note
115, at 1142-44 (noting that the Court has stated that it cannot be presumed as a matter of
law that an individual of one group will not discriminate against members of that same
group).
270. See, e.g., Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims Under Title VII, 12 LAB. LAw. 291,293 (1996) (arguing that same-sex
sexual harassment should be recognized because it is discrimination based on sex);
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,761
(1997) (starting with Professor MacKinnon's anti-subordination principles and expanding
them to encompass same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII because social
subordination touches both men and women); Shahan, supra note 73, at 527 ("Courts
should continually strive to fulfill the purposes of Title VII and hold persons liable for
sexual harassment regardless of whether the victim is of the opposite sex or of the same
sex and regardless of the person's sexual orientation.").
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sexual harassment claim is dependent on the sexual orientation of the
perpetrator creates problems for homosexuals seeking remedies
under Title VII. Since the statute does not prohibit harassment
because of sexual orientation,"l people may not sue if they were
harassed because of their heterosexuality or homosexuality.
Furthermore, Wrightson provides support for a Title VII same-sex
sexual harassment claim only when the harasser is homosexual and
the victim is heterosexual.'m Thus, the Fourth Circuit has placed
homosexuals and lesbians in a precarious situation. They have no
claim for harassment based on their sexual orientation, but they can
be liable for sexually harassing a heterosexual. In contrast, under
Wrightson, a heterosexual could not be found liable for the same-sex
sexual harassment of another heterosexual or homosexual. As a
result,
[p]laintiffs who are gay or appear to be gay will lose because
the court will view their harassment as "based on sexual
orientation" and therefore not covered by Title VII.
Plaintiffs who are straight or appear to be straight will win
because the court will view their harassment as "based on
gender" and therefore covered by Title VII.2n
271. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
272. The court does not expressly state that the victim must be heterosexual, but in
Wrightson the victim was heterosexual. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 139. The Fourth
Circuit held in McWilliams that no Title VII cause of action exists to redress
heterosexual-on-heterosexual harassment. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.) (rejecting a claim of harassment by a
heterosexual on a heterosexual of the same sex), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996); see also
supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text (discussing McWilliams).
273. Grose, supra note 101, at 388; see also Colker, supra note 257, at 206-07 (asserting
that existing case law allows recovery only for heterosexuals who are harassed
homosexually, but not for homosexuals harassed by the same methods, even with the
same words).
Indeed, the only way to rationalize the Wrightson court's reasoning without using the
split logic that Grose has highlighted may be to consider the Fourth Circuit as having
adopted a "because of sexual orientation" test for same-sex sexual harassment under
Title VIi-at least "because of the harasser's sexual orientation." However, such a test
could clearly produce some difficulties. First, one can easily imagine cases in which the
sexual orientations of the parties would be difficult to determine. Next, both
heterosexual-on-heterosexual and homosexual-on-homosexual harassment would go
unrecognized because in those cases the sexual orientation of both the perpetrator and
the victim would be the same. Finally, in order to adhere completely to a "because of
sexual orientation" test, it seems that the Fourth Circuit would have to recognize a cause
of action for heterosexual-on-homosexual harassment. If the court were ever presented
with such a case and declined to recognize a cause of action, its split logic-with all its
inequities-would be dramatically revealed. Therefore, by conditioning its recognition of
same-sex sexual harassment on the sexual orientation of the harasser, the Fourth Circuit
may have created new issues that it will have to confront in future decisions.
[Vol. 76
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The possible result of the type of decision in Wrightson is
"perpetuat[ion of] an atmosphere of homophobia in the workplace,
while providing no protection for the victims of such an
atmosphere." 274 In fact, Carolyn Grose argues that in same-sex sexual
harassment cases when a heterosexual acts sexually toward another
heterosexual, courts reason that no sexual harassment occurred, only
that "'boys will be boys' "; but when a homosexual acts sexually
toward a heterosexual, then courts conclude that sexual harassment
has occurred.'5 "In order to be eligible for protection, then," she
states, "plaintiffs and harassers must conform to the legal system's
idea of 'normal' sexuality and sexual interaction: heterosexuality." 6
This result should not be surprising because courts have
consistently dealt with the issue of sex and gender in a different way
than they have dealt with sexual orientation.' Professor Ruth
Colker has asserted that sexual harassment doctrine "has narrowed
to include only heterosexualized claims."2' 8 According to I. Bennett
Capers, this apparent heterosexist bias in Title VII is troubling
because it reinforces the problem of male dominance in society.27 9 He
has explained that "a male dominated society objects to male
homosexuality because it is threatened by fragmentations in the male
274. Grose, supra note 101, at 385-86.
275. Id. at 390-92; see also Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual
Horseplay? The False Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 201, 220 (1996) (noting that male-on-male harassment committed by
heterosexual males is trivialized as horseplay, while similar conduct by homosexual males
is considered sexual harassment).
276. Grose, supra note 101, at 393. Grose contends that the need to conform to
heterosexuality in order to get Title VII protection is just one example of the
domestication of homosexuals. See id. at 394-95 (listing examples). Domestication occurs
"when the values of the dominant, legal, society become 'so internalized that they are
considered to be common sense.'" Id at 394 (quoting Ruthann Robson, Incendiary
Categories: Lesbians/Violence/Law, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 30 (1993)). Other
examples include marriage, domestic violence, and child custody preferences. See id. at
394-96.
277. See id. at 378. See generally Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and
the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508 (1989) (surveying the rights that gay men and lesbians
are not afforded).
278. Colker, supra note 257, at 199. Bisexual harassers create additional problems and
complexities. See supra notes 211-26 and accompanying text (describing cases both
allowing and disallowing bisexual liability under Title VII); see also Levitsky, supra note
226, at 1027-30 (discussing the loophole for bisexuals suggested in Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and the general inadequacies of Title VII sexual
harassment standards).
279. See Capers, supra note 85, at 1163-67. Heterosexism reinforces sexism by
penalizing those who do not conform to the bipolar gender system and rewarding those
who do, and it subordinates women through the male-dominated hierarchical society. See
id. at 1162-63.
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role that could lead to less male dominance, less male power. '
Similarly, lesbianism threatens male-dominated society by asserting
that a woman's sexuality does not exist only for men.2' Along these
lines, Carolyn Grose concludes that if the state regulates same-sex
sexual harassment, then the state's power to delimit legitimate sex is
strengthened.m The court's ability to define legitimate and
illegitimate kinds of sex could be the result of regulation based on a
Wrightson paradigm.
Besides these dangers, the Wrightson decision also has the
potential to produce practical problems for homosexual workers. In
the Fourth Circuit, there is no federal law proscribing discrimination
based on sexual orientation, and only homosexuals may be liable for
same-sex sexual harassment. E. Gary Spitko argues that "the
incongruence ... provides a powerful financial incentive to
employers to discriminate against gay men and lesbians."
' '
Specifically,
[a]Ithough federal law would not protect gay men and
lesbians from such employment discrimination based on
their sexual orientation, their potential employers would
face an increased likelihood of liability for alleged same-sex
sexual harassment, relative to the likelihood of liability for
an allegation of comparable mixed-sex sexual harassment.
Thus, the employer would be prudent, all other factors
being equal, to refuse to emploY~ay people-an option that
remains legal under federal law.
Thus, the Wrightson decision to base actionability on sexual
orientation is not without troublesome consequences.
There are at least two possible solutions to this problem. The
more radical of the two solutions would deny same-sex sexual
harassment claims under Title VII until passage of a statute "that
provides protection for lesbians and gay men because they are
lesbians and gay men, not because they have been harassed by
lesbians and gay men." As long as Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation but does prohibit same-
sex sexual harassment, homosexuals and lesbians are
280. Id. at 1165.
281. See U
282. See Grose, supra note 101, at 397.
283. Spitko, supra note 73, at 73.
284. Id. at 73-74.
285. Grose, supra note 101, at 397.
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disadvantaged.' If no same-sex sexual harassment claims were
allowed, then homosexuals and lesbians would be in no worse a
position than heterosexuals as far as Title VII was concerned:
homosexuals could not sue if they were harassed because they are
homosexual, and heterosexuals could not sue if they were harassed
by a homosexual of the same sex. Once a federal law was passed to
prohibit harassment based on one's sexual orientation, then an action
for same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII could be considered
more seriously."' At that point, homosexuals would approach "equal
footing" with heterosexuals as the heterosexist bias in current Title
VII jurisprudence already protects heterosexuality.m
The other potential solution, in opposition to Wrightson, would
allow courts to consider same-sex sexual harassment without
considering the sexual orientation .of either the harasser or the
victim.ns This approach would remove the intrusive and complicated
need to prove sexual orientation in court.2' Moreover, it would
reinforce the power theory of sexual harassment by recognizing that
"victimization is not always motivated by attraction; harassment
frequently involves issues of power and control on the part of the
harasser."29'
The first position, that no same-sex sexual harassment claims
should be recognized until a statute proscribing harassment because
of sexual orientation is passed, would come full circle if such a statute
was actually passed. However, a more feasible alternative might be
to create a neutral law under which both heterosexuals and
homosexuals could face same-sex sexual harassment charges. Such a
law would at least eliminate the problem generated by the Wrightson
court-that only homosexuals are subject to liability for same-sex
286. See Spitko, supra note 73, at 80 ("[Ijncreased exposure to liability, coupled with
de jure immunity for the employer who refuses to employ a gay person, provides a
powerful incentive to the employer, all other factors being equal, to prefer to employ the
non-gay candidate over the gay candidate.").
287. See id. at 78 (noting that sexual orientation discrimination fits easily under the
but-for test of sexual discrimination because but for his sex, a gay man would not be
discriminated against for having a romantic interest in another man).
288. More specifically, the "reasonable person" used in sexual harassment claims
reflects the community's standards and ideals and thus, often "is ideally suited for
subordinating sexual minorities who do not conform to the majority's norms." Id at 82.
289. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1147; see also Colker, supra note 257, at 204 ("If
sexual advances are gender-based because they are intended to demean and objectify the
victim, then whether the source of the attraction is heterosexuality or homosexuality
should be irrelevant.").
290. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1147.
291. Id.
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sexual harassment. Even this solution, however, has critics, and some
commentators question whether the heterosexist bias is so strongly
embedded in Title VII jurisprudence that homosexuals would be the
only ones facing same-sex sexual harassment litigation, regardless of
the law's apparent neutrality.m
As long as there are no statutes protecting homosexuals from
harassment,2 3 then courts appear to be faced with the choice of (1)
creating a Wrightson remedy that limits the potential harassers to
homosexuals and thus potentially perpetuates homophobia;294 (2)
denying any same-sex sexual harassment coverage, which may allow
harassment to continue in the workplace;295 or (3) finding a focus
other than sexual orientation on which to determine the viability of
same-sex sexual harassment claims.2'
As courts like the Fourth Circuit explore how to determine the
viability of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII, they
should determine whether same-sex sexual harassment is really
discrimination. This inquiry is key because if same-sex sexual
harassment is not discrimination, then Title VII should not cover it."'
The debate may rest on whether the injury is based on group injury
or individual injury.299 Under the group theory, "discrimination can
be defined as 'harming someone or denying someone a benefit
because that person is a member of a group that the discriminator
despises.' ,,2 This definition does not work with same-sex sexual
harassment because the harasser, being part of the same group as the
victim, would be unlikely to want to harm its members.' The sheer
292. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 101, at 396-97. Grose asks, "[a]s long as Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, why should we trust
the legal system to apply Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment in anything but a
discriminatory and heterosexist way?" Ma. at 397. Under this solution, moreover, Spitko's
assertion that employers will hire heterosexuals over homosexuals due to potential sexual
harassment claims would still be valid because of the unavailability of an action for
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and because of the persistence of the
heterosexist bias that punishes those not conforming to heterosexuality. See Spitko, supra
note 73, at 73-74.
293. See Stone-Harris, supra note 73, at 315-24 (urging the legislature to adopt the
proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation).
294. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
295. See infra note 334 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
297. See Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1171.
298. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
299. Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1171 (quoting Paul, supra note 253, at 352).
300. See id. Of course, the assertion that members of the same group would not harm
one another would not be true for the homosexual-on-heterosexual harassment because
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lewdness and excessive sexual behavior of the fact patterns that the
courts have faced, however, make this conclusion questionable 1
That is, according to the victims' allegations in the same-sex sexual
harassment cases presented thus far, the harassers have appeared to
intend to harm, both physically and emotionally, members of their
own sex.' At the very least, this is how the victims interpreted the
actions and were affected by them.
By inquiring into the motives of the harasser and not the
impressions of the victim, the courts may be refusing to recognize
that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the severity of sexual
harassment is diminished because the victim and perpetrator are of
the same gender." 3 This realization has led some commentators to
conclude that analysis of such discrimination under Title VII should
focus on the treatment of the victim, not the motivation behind the
treatment.U As one commentator suggested, "[flederal judges
should ... reduce the heightened scrutiny they now place on the
causation element of a sexual harassment claim and pay closer
attention to the actual conduct, and its effect on victims of
harassment ... ,0 This would eliminate the need for a judge to
differentiate between "but for," "because of," and "based on" in
Title VII cases.' Simply put, "[i]f the conduct was discriminatory
and unwelcome, and if it fulfills all the elements of a prima facie
sexual harassment case, it falls within the purview of Title VII."' '
This focus realizes that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, ridicule,
intimidation, and other harassing acts are no less injurious and
degrading to someone of the harasser's same gender than they are to
they would be members of two distinct groups. See id.
301. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (describing
incidents in which an employee's testicles were grabbed and squeezed by other
employees); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.)
(involving an employee who endured threats of homosexual rape from co-workers and a
bar of soap forced into his anus), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 95 F.3d 56
(5th Cir. 1996), cert granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (4th Cir.) (stating that male co-workers tied down
McWilliams and placed a finger in his mouth to simulate oral sex and fondled him on
another occasion), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
302. See, e.g., Quick, 90 F.3d a't 1374; Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118-19; McWilliams, 72 F.3d at
1193-94; see also supra notes 121, 162-64, 194 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
of those cases in detail).
303. Levay, supra note 82, at 1632.
304. See id.; Murphy, supra note 115, at 1145-47; Papish, supra note 275, at 233-34.
305. Papish, supra note 275, at 233.
306. See supra notes 227-40 and accompanying text (discussing how the circuit courts
have considered these causation terms).
307. Murphy, supra note 115, at 1145.
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an individual of the opposite gender.""' 8 Sexual orientation could
perhaps have a role in this paradigm as well, but it would not be an
element of the cause of action, as Wrightson has mandated.'
Instead, sexual orientation could be used to show how the
perpetrator acted or to show the effect of the harassment on the
victim. On the other hand, one commentator has suggested that
sexual orientation could be completely irrelevant if courts focused
only on the conduct and the victim's reactions to it."'
A number of other commentators have offered suggestions on
how to handle the same-sex sexual harassment issue, but none thus
far has found that only homosexuals should be liable, as Wrightson
did. Some commentators have proposed expanding the meaning of
sex and sexual harassment in order to facilitate a fairer adjudication
of same-sex sexual harassment. For example, Regina L. Stone-Harris
has proposed adopting a broader definition of "sex," along with
"focusing on the alleged misconduct before applying the 'but for'
test."31' Stone-Harris suggests that sex should mean "sex-related. 31 2
Along the same lines, Samuel Marcosson argues that sexual-
orientation discrimination should be actionable under Title VII, and
he states that harassment that is of a sexual nature, but not sex-based,
should also be actionable."'
While some commentators offer solutions involving expansion of
the definition of sexual harassment, at least one commentator has
concluded that no same-sex sexual harassment actions should lie
under Title VII because the court has used the action in a manner
that discriminates against homosexuals. 4 In his article, E. Gary
Spitko accuses the courts of defining "sex" in a heterosexist and
homophobic manner.315  He maintains that homosexuals, both
perpetrators and victims, are held to a different standard than
heterosexuals in sexual harassment cases. 6 First, homosexuals are
30& Id at 1146.
309. See Papish, supra note 275, at 233 (relying on Judge Michael's dissent in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1198 (4th Cir.)
(Michael, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996), as appropriately characterizing
the place of sexual orientation in the Title VII cases).
310. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1147.
311. Stone-Harris, supra note 73, at 311.
312. See id. at 312.
313. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A
Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 23-25 (1992).
314. See Spitko, supra note 73, at 96.
315. See id, at 79-80.
316. See id. at 81-89.
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subjected to the ubiquitous "reasonable person" standard, which
does not account for their sexual orientation. 7 Second, he asserts
that homosexuals involved in same-sex sexual harassment will be
further harmed by society's heterosexism because society condones
and values actions by heterosexuals while condemning the same
actions "when engaged in by a gay person.""31 While Spitko did not
consider Wrightson, his arguments- are bolstered by the court's
decision. That is, the Fourth Circuit, by naming homosexuals as the
only potential tortfeasors in a Title VII same-sex sexual harassment
claim, may be doing outright what Spitko believes most courts have
done behind closed doors: revealing a preference for heterosexuality
and heterosexism.319 In fact, Judge Murnaghan, the dissenting judge
in Wrightson, called the Fourth Circuit's decision to hold
homosexuals and not heterosexuals liable for same-sex sexual
harassment "more discriminatory" than finding no cause of action at
all.320
As the Supreme Court considers the Oncale case, it will attempt
to resolve the same-sex sexual harassment dilemma under Title VII
and perhaps decide which result is more discriminatory-no cause of
action, or a cause of action against only homosexuals. 2 At this point,
the circuit courts are in a state of confusion and the law is certainly in
need of guidance.32 The Supreme Court's consideration of the
Oncale case, however, may not provide that guidance. As the
Eleventh Circuit recognized in Fredette, the Fifth Circuit's same-sex
sexual harassment decisions in Garcia and later in Oncale do not
provide a great deal of reasoning. The Eleventh Circuit concluded.
317. See id. at 82-84 (analogizing the need for a reasonable homosexual standard to
the need for a reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases).
318. Id. at 85. Spitko uses the example of a 1995 broadcast of the "Jenny Jones"
television talk-show that resulted in murder. See idU at 86. The show, featuring secret
admirers, included a homosexual man, Scott Amedure, who "revealed his attraction" for
his neighbor, Jonathan Schmitz. Id. A few days later, Schmitz murdered Amedure
because of the incident on the show. See id. Spitko notes that the press coverage focused
almost entirely on the partial blame of the television show for humiliating Schmitz, while
Amedure's death was hardly discussed. See id. at 87-88. Spitko concludes that "'[tIhe
sole reason that everyone is discussing Schmitz's "humiliation" with such ease is that
homophobia is so common in this country as to be considered normal.'" Id. at 88
(quoting Robin Kane, Perspectives on Homophobia, Hate, Not Humiliation, Is at Fault,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at B7). Spitko questions whether "a jury would excuse" a
murder in response to a heterosexual advance. See idt at 89. He is convinced the answer
is no. See id.
319. See id. at 79-80.
320. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
321. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
322- See supra notes 143-241 and accompanying text.
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that "[t]he Garcia holding was the last of several independent and
alternative holdings and was accompanied by no reasoning
whatsoever. Oncale also provided no rationale to support the
holding ... ."' Thus, how the Supreme Court will approach the case
and how it will approach same-sex sexual harassment generally are
difficult to predict. Moreover, whether the judiciary can properly
accept this policy-making role is uncertain. As one court stated,
"'[A] court must be wary where meaning is sought to be derived
from other than specific language, lest what professes to be mere
rendering becomes creation.' "34 Making policy is the role of elected
representatives, and "'"it is their privilege to act wisely or unwisely
or not to act at all." ' ,3 With Title VII, both the statutory language
and legislative history give the courts little guidance.3" Furthermore,
legislators may be in a better position to create a broad,
comprehensive solution that could serve the needs of more groups
rather than adjudicating claims one by one."z
While the legislature may be in a better position to act, there is a
pressing and immediate need for uniformity. Currently, whether a
person has a viable claim for same-sex sexual harassment under Title
VII depends on where that person files a claim. The Supreme
Court has taken a large step by granting certiorari in the Oncale case
and is poised to take an even greater one when it issues its decision.329
Perhaps it will answer some of the same-sex sexual harassment
questions, or at least encourage Congress to do so. Meanwhile, the
circuit courts will continue to decide cases in a piecemeal fashion.
323. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1997).
324. Levay, supra note 82, at 1628-29 (quoting In re Shear, 139 F. Supp. 217,221 (N.D.
Cal. 1956)).
325. Id. (quoting In re Shear, 139 F. Supp. at 221, 223 (quoting Frank E. Horack, Jr.,
'Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. REV. 247,253 (1946))).
326. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
327. See Same Sex Harassment, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1996, at A18 ("[Ljegislators can
best sort out the distinctions between same-sex harassment that involves jokes about sex
... from assaultive same-sex harassment inflicted specifically because of the victim's
gender and that should be punished as such.").
328. See supra notes 120-241 and accompanying text (detailing the complex and
confusing circuit opinions).
329. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. In light of the Court's recent
decision to strike down Colorado's Amendment 2-a measure that prohibited the
enactment of any law that would protect homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices, or relationships-as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1622 (1996), the Court may
be prepared to approach the sexual orientation issues involved in same-sex sexual
harassment. For a recent analysis of Romer, see William M. Wilson, Note, Romer v.
Evans: "Terminal Silliness," or Enlightened Jurisprudence?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1891 (1997).
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Overall, the Fourth Circuit has taken a distinctive stand by
limiting Wrightson's claim for same-sex sexual harassment to
situations in which a homosexual is the harasser, and in this case,
when the target is a heterosexual of the same sex.' ° While
Wrightson's recognition of this limited subset of same-sex sexual
harassment claims can benefit victims by recognizing a cause of
action for their harassment, it has troubling implications for
homosexuals.33' Following Wrightson, the clear conclusion is that
only homosexuals can be found liable for same-sex sexual
harassment.3 2 Under Title VII, more generally, homosexuals have no
cause of action if they are harassed because of their sexual
orientation.33  They lose twice. Unfortunately, there is no easy
solution to this problem.
If the courts determine that same-sex sexual harassment differs
too fundamentally from sexual harassment theory or that using same-
sex sexual harassment will be too detrimental to homosexuals, then
they may rule that no same-sex sexual harassment claims will lie
under Title VII. This would result in a denial of civil fights, a denial
of a Title VII remedy, and a potential for the continuation of wrongs
in the workplace." A number of tort remedies would still exist for
the victims,3 35 but because "there is no reason to believe that the
severity of sexual harassment is diminished because the victim and
perpetrator are of the same gender, and there are no valid interests to
be protected by allowing sexual harassment to continue in the
workplace, ' '336 limiting Title VII may not be the best answer.3 7 Ellen
330. See supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text (explaining the Wrightson
majority's reasoning).
331. See supra notes 271-84 and accompanying text.
332. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141.
333. See supra notes 96,271-84 and accompanying text.
334. See Murphy, supra note 115, at 1126.
335. See Ruth C. Vance, Workers' Compensation and Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: A Remedy for Employees, or a Shield for Employers?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
141, 150-51 (1993) (noting that the causes of action for sexual harassment besides Title
VII include the torts of negligent hiring, negligent retention, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, intentional interference with a
contract, and fraud and deceit); Woodhouse, supra note 73, at 1181-84 (discussing use of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, other types of tort remedies, and damages
otherwise available); see also Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)
("State causes of action for assault, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress readily come to mind.").
336. Levay, supra note 82, at 1632.
337. The tort claims available to victims of sexual harassment have significant
limitations. First, the majority of the torts are brought against employers based on agency
theories and thus the harasser's tortious act must be committed within the scope of
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Frankel Paul offers a guide to the courts and the legislature when she
writes, "[t]he law is supposed to look to acts, whether criminal or
tortious, to determine culpability and not to the individual
characteristics of the perpetrators: that is precisely what is meant by
the rule of law."3
JOANNA P. L. MANGUM
employment. See Vance, supra note 335, at 151. Second, an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff victim to demonstrate that the
defendant engaged in extreme behavior beyond what is necessary for a prima facie case
of sexual harassment under Title VII. See Spitko, supra note 73, at 58. Finally, in
approximately half of the states, workers' compensation statutes are the exclusive remedy
for sexual harassment. See id at 59. Liability under workers' compensation laws is
usually significantly less than under Title VII, and workers' compensation does not allow
recovery for punitive or fully compensatory damages. See id.
338. Paul, supra note 253, at 351.
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